



Society in movement 
The changing meanings of “social movement” sketch a history of the past quarter-millennium of 
popular struggles to change the world: how people have organized themselves and understood their 
activity. The term appeared in mid-nineteenth century Europe to grasp the French Revolution, the 
pan-European revolutions of 1848, and the rise of democratic, nationalist and socialist organizations. 
Contemporary elites were experiencing a disconcerting shift, mapped in the changing meanings of 
“society” away from the small world of those who counted, as in the capitalized usage of “Society”, 
when others (the vast majority) could be expected to “know their place” (Williams 1983). Earlier 
elites, then, could understand the human world purely in terms of political theory or economics. Our 
use of “society” to refer to all human beings and their interrelationships came into being as those 
others stepped out of “their place”, raising “the social question”.  
“The social movement” represented the attempts of the vast majority to answer “the social 
question”; or the uprising of society against Society in a struggle for equality, democracy and the 
future (Cox 2013). This took many different forms: conspiratorial democrats, working-class socialists, 
Polish or Irish nationalism, resistance to imperial wars, freethought, opposition to slavery, women’s 
struggles for equality among others (Barker 2013). The movement of society against the status quo 
was not a single, or simple, thing: individuals and organizations involved themselves with many 
different issues as they arose in actual organising.  
There was much to be gained by this, in a world where left and right both assumed that increased 
democracy would inevitably lead to social change. Before formal democracy, independent nation 
states and the end of empires, welfare states, legal equality for women, the abolition of slavery, 
religious freedom etc., it was reasonable to believe that transforming just one of these dimensions 
might entail far wider changes. However, in this same period – between the revolutions of 1848 and 
the defeat in most countries of the revolutionary wave of 1916-24 – most European elites shifted 
from trying to put “society” back in its box to strategies of securing popular consent for continued 
inequality, whether by selective concessions to individual groups or through mass popular 
mobilization on the right, a strategy pursued from Bonapartism via fascism to Christian Democracy 
and present-day racism (Cox 2018).  
 
Movement as political organization 
Movement successes changed the practical meaning of “movement”, as the earlier situation – of 
sporadic waves of mass revolt, often clandestine organizations in a context of generalized illegality 
and tenuous links with individually sympathetic elite members –  was replaced by one where even 
working-class struggles could sustain large trade unions, extensive mutual aid organizations, 
women’s and youth groups, national and local daily papers or mass political parties, typically 
organized hierarchically: the classic example being the German SPD. 
It also became necessary to speak of multiple movements, as fascist movements grew, the alliance 
between liberal and working-class movements broke apart, and the latter split between communist 
and social-democratic forms. In the early twentieth century, these all took state power, and used it 
brutally against their opponents. So too, starting in Ireland, and after WWII across Asia and Africa, 
anti-colonial and nationalist movements took power, with varying relationships to peasant and 
working-class movements. The changed structure of popular action meant that “movement” was 
often a synonym for a party-affiliated constellation of organizations aiming at, or controlling, state 
power. Hence “movement” became a dirty word in post-war West Germany, associated with Nazism 
and orthodox communism (Raschke 1988); while one could tot up references to “ThiGMOO”, “this 
great movement of ours” at British Labour Party conferences (Byrne 1999). 
  
New social movements 
By contrast with mid-twentieth century left, nationalist and fascist movements, the New Left from 
the mid-1960s on used “new social movements” to describe things as diverse as the US Civil Rights 
Movement, west European opposition to nuclear weapons, student activism culminating in 1968, 
the Prague Spring, the women’s and gay liberation movements, the counter-culture, squatting, anti-
nuclear power or environmental movements. This usage spread to the majority world, particularly to 
Latin America and South Asia, in the 1970s and 1980s.  Often, within a Marxist analysis, such 
movements were seen as “new” because they lacked the hierarchically-controlled architecture of 
mass organizations, the single party line – and sometimes any obvious link between participants’ 
material situation and the movements’ core issues.  
Some Marxists in the US and UK – themselves nostalgic for “proper movements” more imagined 
than real – read this as a political or theoretical choice between movements. This drew on a 
(university-based, white, male) identity politics whose “workerist” view of popular movements 
excluded actual left histories of support for women’s struggles, anti-racism, resistance to militarism 
and cultural radicalism (Thompson 1976, Rowbotham and Weeks 1977). In these countries, with 
unions under particularly vicious and decisive assault from 1979-80 and far left parties typically 
micro-organizations, the use of “movement” for labour, socialism, anarchism, working-class 
community activism etc. fell out of favour.  
Meanwhile, much Anglophone Marxism shifted to academic and publishing contexts which 
rewarded a focus on structure rather than agency, so that working-class struggles were now 
subordinated to discussions of political economy. Something similar happened on the development 
of academic feminism, black studies, postcolonialism, queer studies, ecological thought, peace 
studies etc. One practical result, in English, is that “social movement” increasingly excludes the main 
organizational components of popular activism between the 1880s and the 1960s. Political parties, 
trade unions, activist media, popular subcultures or politicized religion are rarely recognized as the 
sediment of popular struggle or seen in relationship to wider movements; they are typically studied 
in isolation from one another. Simultaneously, boundary-construction to shape new fields like “civil 
society” or “resistance” disperses understanding, and interest, further. 
This specialization is paralleled by the increasingly niche world of radical publishing and 
communication, which, in neoliberalism, favours fragmentation and the elevation of one aspect of 
popular struggle over others, often as a marker of identity. As mass popular organizations declined 
in the minority world, movements’ own intellectual life became increasingly shaped by the logics of 
commercialism and celebrity, rewarding a politics of opinion based on attacking or ignoring other 
movements rather than building alliances.  
There were also non-intellectual reasons for this. The events of 1968 – whether in Prague, Paris or 
Derry – showed the “last-instance” power of the superpower-backed state.1 With urban guerrilla 
strategies increasingly self-defeating, movements came to define themselves in terms which 
excluded revolution – in stark contrast to previous history. In the majority world, the 
disappointments of national-developmentalism, and the subsequent transformation of independent 
nation-states into transmission belts for neoliberal policies, also undermined the credibility of older 
state-centric revolutionary discourses, a process encapsulated in the title Change the World Without 
Taking Power (Holloway 2002) and the impressive politics of the Zapatista revolution. The prestige of 
state socialist revolutions similarly declined among movement actors, long before 1989 in most 
countries. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, a new wave of movement (semi-) institutionalization saw a further division 
between environmental, women’s, GLTBQI, development, peace, anti-poverty, anti-racist and other 
NGOs, staffed by a small number of professionals dependent on elite support (for funding, media 
coverage, legal victories, access to policy-making, academic credibility etc.) and a new kind of “incivil 
society”, a tension intensified in majority world neoliberalism, where NGOs have increasingly taken 
on quasi-state roles (Sen 2007). The phrase “social movements”, however, often remained in use 
despite this radical shift in practical meaning.   
 
Movements and education 
Education was a significant site of political struggle from an early point, as a location where top-
down power intersected ordinary people’s lives, asserting control of them as children, or of their 
children. Religion played a central role in constructing European education systems; universities bore 
the marks of this origin until well into the 19th and often the 20th centuries, including religious 
requirements for entry, while schools, commonly controlled by religious bodies, concerned 
themselves closely with the moral lives of their pupils. Non-participation, or the construction of 
independent educational structures, was thus a frequent response. The children of the gentry, 
meanwhile, often had private tutors or went to fee-paying schools of various kinds: even where 
these latter were not religious, their purpose of shaping elite solidarity and forming “character” left 
them as eminently disciplinary institutions. As industrialising states developed compulsory education 
systems, these were politicized in different ways in different contexts. 
In early nineteenth-century Ireland, for example, where the colonial Anglican church dominated, 
Catholic children typically attended independent “hedge schools” structured around directly 
supporting a local teacher (often, paradoxically, a radical) with money or in kind; the eventual 
outcome of reforms was a standardized education system in which virtually all schools were run by a 
church (Catholic, Anglican or non-conformist). Similarly, in colonial Sri Lanka, state-subsidized 
 
1 The Prague Spring was ended by Warsaw Pact tanks. At the height of May 1968, de Gaulle flew to the HQ of 
the French army on the Rhine to confirm military support if needed to put down his own uprising. Finally, the 
Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland provoked a violent loyalist reaction which was followed by British 
military intervention and direct rule.  
missionary schools used English-medium education and a “modern” curriculum to challenge the 
traditional temple schools of the Sinhala Buddhist majority. The missionary schools would 
themselves be challenged by the Buddhist Theosophical Society’s schools, combining English-
language provision and a modern curriculum with a modernising Buddhist ethos and serving as an 
organising ground for the developing nationalist middle class (Cox and Sirisena 2016). 
In Britain, meanwhile, working-class radicals resisted upper-class attempts to provide “useful 
knowledge” to their children (in the sense of training them directly in technical skills and workplace 
discipline) with struggles for “really useful knowledge”, understanding that would help challenge the 
power of the employers politically and validate a wider perspective on what human beings were, 
and could be. 
These religious and class dimensions combined in the 1871 Paris Commune, which saw schools, 
including girls’ schools, being expropriated from Catholic religious orders and run on free and 
egalitarian lines: this programme would win out a decade after the Commune’s defeat. More 
radically, the execution of educationalist Francesc Ferrer following Barcelona’s 1909 working-class 
uprising led to the formation of anarchist and secular “Modern Schools” on the model he had 
pioneered, notably in the US (Avrich 1980).  
From the later 19th century on, however, the combination of the costs involved in running mass 
education and its increasing political significance in an age of rising working-class self-assertion 
meant that a combination of state, religious and private schools dominated. The anarchist school 
movement represented an extraordinary achievement in terms of self-organization, as did the 
various forms of radical working-class adult education (self-organized, supported by sympathetic 
elites or within trade union and political party contexts).  
The Steiner-Waldorf school movement, which in very different ways challenged the instrumentalist 
view of education as a means to discipline and train future workers, began in 1919 with a model 
school that brought together all the children of the Waldorf cigar factory in Stuttgart – workers’, 
clerks’ and managers’ children alike – in a co-educational context shaped by German Romanticism to 
initiate a movement which remains active to this day as probably the single largest alternative / 
independent education movement on the planet.  
 
1968 and the challenge to educational power 
Despite these marginal challenges, however, the new dispensation was remarkably successful in 
many different political contexts in imposing its definition of the meanings and purposes of 
education: moral character (whether framed in religious terms or not but always with a strong 
gender component); the making of citizens (through using the dominant national language and an 
official curriculum around national literature, history etc.); social selection; and more or less visibly 
employment-related training.  Consistent with this, most conflicts around education for several 
decades were dominated by issues of religious power and distributive issues, or at the most radical 
(as in colonial Burma) the formation of an alternative national elite that sought to replace the 
existing power structure. 
The educational struggles now symbolized by the date 1968 were of a very different kind 
(Mohandesi et al. 2018). As already noted, the state as an agent of positive change was less credible; 
those destined for white-collar jobs on graduation were no longer enthused by the prospect; and 
cultural change had eroded the viability of older, moralising discourses (recall that the uprising in the 
secular French system was sparked off in part over the issue of student sexuality).  
Along with these conflicts came an increasing critique of what Paulo Freire would later call “banking 
education”, a top-down, teacher-dominated system geared to the transmission, memorization and 
repetition of supposedly neutral knowledge. Students turned the critical eyes of their own disciplines 
(particularly in the social sciences and humanities) on the actual social relations of education, while 
also drawing on newer forms of anti-authoritarian Marxism, radical democracy and anarchism – 
soon to be joined by the developing discourses of feminism, Black studies, post-colonialism, queer 
studies and other perspectives. 
Although these struggles came towards the end of the “thirty glorious years” (1945-1975) of 
expanding university, other educational and welfare-state provision, they succeeded in substantially 
challenging power relations within the university, introducing new pedagogic approaches, 
democratising many everyday interactions – and unleashing radical impulses into children’s and 
adult education, social care and youth work, children’s publishing and media, and many other areas 
of life.  
These impulses were increasingly contained or even the object of culture-war offensives from the 
right in later decades, as well as being more quietly defeated by neoliberal cuts, an increasing focus 
on testing students and evaluating faculty, and a grimmer economic outlook which privileged 
instrumental approaches to education and employer interests. However the legacy of radical 
thought within education remains significant, and if student movements are once again primarily 
organized around distributive concerns, they are more likely to do so as part of a wider critique of 
society. 
 
Education and social movements 
Post-Fordism saw two important shifts from the later 1970s: a major shift in employment structures 
which undermined the traditional organizations of the working class, while as noted statist (social-
democratic, communist, nationalist) political parties were also in decline. The loss of these and other 
traditional bases for radical organization – such as independent newspapers – coincided with the 
institutionalization of non-elite forms of third-level education, in terms both of employment 
situation and student recruitment, to make the latter an obvious, not always conscious, site for the 
formation of new kinds of movement thinking. Along with IT workers, academics today have a 
relative control over their working time and ability to switch employer that parallels those of the 
classic nineteenth-century radical trades such as cobblers and twentieth-century trades such as 
printers: not necessarily as the sources of mass recruitment but as forms of employment that enable 
a greater degree of political activism of various kinds. Some activists also found that traditional skills 
of public speaking, activist writing and basic organization helped them in the academic workplace. 
The downside, as in earlier artistic subcultures, is the tendency for processes of radical opinion-
formation, agitation within the small confines of the university and critical analysis to far outstrip 
actual organising and connections with the wider social world. Moreover, the connections to that 
wider world which are most readily available are those of publishing and speaking celebrity, in other 
words a form of capitalist marketplace which in the late 20th and early 21st century increasingly 
privileges a pure politics of opinion as a way to establish oneself within a specific niche market 
defined by particular identity markers (including white men from working-class backgrounds). 
This is not a problem in itself – movements always have to find their origins within the social world 
as it actually is if they are to develop – but it can be a problem if these issues are not recognized and 
in-group polemics around minor differences in language (characteristic of the university 
environment) are seen as constituting “real politics” at the expense of practical engagement with 
wider social needs and struggles. This is just as true for organising in working-class contexts as it is 
for organising around race, gender, sexuality or disability: actual organising work involves listening to 
people for long enough to hear the needs and embryonic solutions they are articulating. In this 
sense, educationally-based radicals have a particular responsibility to always try to make links 
beyond the boundaries of the institution and to avoid allowing the “small differences” naturally 
valued by both adolescents and intellectuals to become essentialized to the point of preventing 
effective alliance formation.  
 
Reclaiming social movement 
One important antidote to allowing popular movements to be remade in the image of the university 
is to pay particular attention to movements’ own learning processes. As we have seen, much 
academic theorising is “frozen” movement thought: the challenge is then to “reclaim, recycle and 
reuse” these for today’s movements (Cox and Nilsen 2014). This is also true for the forms of thought 
and learning: if an older generation of radical pedagogy transcribes the practices of 1968, of Freire or 
of feminist consciousness-raising into the classroom, it is time again to pay attention to the new 
shapes which social movement learning, teaching and theorising are taking (Cox 2014). Rather than 
uncritically transcribe what have become institutional logics into our wider politics, in other words, 
dialogue between these older sediments of movement practice in educational politics and the new 
impulses of radical education outside the institution can help to find appropriate organising 
languages to enable new alliances to be formed. 
This has certainly been the case in the global movement of movements against neoliberalism, not 
least in Latin American struggles over the past 24 years, in the Occupy and indignado moments of 
2011, the revolutionary crises in the Arab world or Rojava today. Despite the hard lessons of the past 
quarter-millennium of popular self-organization, long histories of institutionalization and 
incorporation, neoliberal fragmentation and political niche markets, new struggles keep springing 
up; movements keep making alliances across differences and reach towards a general 
transformation of society. Society is still in movement, and understanding this still matters (Cox 
2018).  
The phrase “social movements” still has real potential: in understanding that society is made and 
contested, not given, and in seeing what past struggles have achieved and how much is going on 
today (from micro-level resistance to moments of revolution). The plural is important: there are no 
automatic alliances (and few automatic conflicts). Struggles around class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality 
or ability can be connected as movements from below; and we need each other if we want to win. 
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